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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
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No. 00-3430 
 
MONTROSE MEDICAL GROUP 
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RICHARD A. BULGER; WALTER GARVEY; 
MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK 
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MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK; 
RICHARD A. BULGER, Third-Party Plaintif fs 
 
v. 
 
EUDORA BENNETT; MONTROSE MEDICAL ARTS 
PHARMACY, INC.; MEDICAL ARTS NURSING 
CENTER, INC.; MEDICAL ARTS CLINIC, 
Third-Party Defendants 
 
On Appeal From the United States District Court 
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 94-cv-02141) 
District Judge: Honorable Thomas I. Vanaskie, Chief Judge 
 
Argued: November 30, 2000 
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(Filed March 22, 2001) 
 
       WILLIAM W. WARREN, JR., 
        ESQUIRE (ARGUED) 
       Saul, Ewing, Remick & Saul, LLP 
       Penn National Insurance Tower 
       2 North Second Street, 7th Floor 
       Harrisburg, PA 17101 
 
       CATHLEEN M. DEVLIN, ESQUIRE 
       Saul, Ewing, Remick & Saul, LLP 
       Centre Square West 
       1500 Market Street, 38th Floor 
       Philadelphia, PA 19102 
 
       Counsel for Appellants 
         
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
* Honorable Frank J. Magill, United States Cir cuit Judge for the Eighth 
Circuit, sitting by designation. The Honorable Marjorie O. Rendell 
participated in this case from its inception in this Court through pre- 
filing circulation of the opinion to the full Court pursuant to Third 
Circuit Internal Operating Procedur e 5.6.4. At that juncture, the routine 
computer recusal check made for all cir culating opinions revealed, for 
the first time, a recusal problem in the nature of contributions to the 
political campaign of her husband Edward G. Rendell, former Mayor of 
Philadelphia. The background of the problem is encapsulated in the 
following notice, that is routinely sent to all parties and their counsel 
in 
all cases in this Court when the docketing notice is sent. 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______ 
NOTICE 
________ 
 
        TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL: 
 
         You are hereby advised that the Honorable Marjorie O. Rendell, 
       a judge of this Court, whose spouse, Edward G. Rendell, has raised 
       funds for his campaigns for public office, advises the parties and 
       counsel in this case that Judge Rendell will automatically recuse 
       in all cases where the aggregate campaign contribution to Rendell 
       `95 by a party or law firm repr esenting a party, from January 1, 
       1995 to the present, is $2501.00 or greater. For contributions less 
       than $2501.00, Judge Rendell will not automatically recuse unless 
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       the parties or counsel in the case file an objection.* Mr. Rendell 
does 
       not currently hold elective office but is chairman of the 
Democratic 
       National Committee, headquartered in Washington, D.C. 
 
         During the pendency of this appeal, Judge Rendell could be one 
       of the judges randomly assigned to decide a motion or the merits of 
       this case. IF YOU OBJECT TO HER DOING SO BASED ON A 
       CONTRIBUTION(S) MADE BY A PARTY OR COUNSEL IN THE 
       CASE, you may object to her participation by filing the enclosed 
       CONFIDENTIAL REQUEST FOR DISQUALIFICATION  within ten 
       (10) days of the date of the docketing letter. 
 
         IF YOU DO SO OBJECT, Judge Rendell will be automatically 
       disqualified from participation in any aspect of this appeal; 
       otherwise, Judge Rendell will participate if the case is assigned 
to 
       her. 
 
         IF YOU DO NOT OBJECT, you will be deemed to have waived 
       objection to Judge Rendell's participation in any aspect of this 
       appeal. Also, if Judge Rendell is automatically recused as set 
forth 
       above, nonetheless all parties can agree to waive disqualification 
to 
       her participation by filing the enclosed JOINT REQUEST FOR 
       WAIVER. Such waiver would be made part of the public record. 
 
       By the Court: 
       /s/ Edward R. Becker 
       _____________________________ 
       Edward R. Becker, Chief Judge 
 
Date: Wednesday, June 21, 2000 
 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
        *Complete reports of contributions to Rendell `95 are available as 
       public records from the Office of the City Commissioners, Room 
       130, City Hall, Philadelphia, PA 19107 (telephone: 215-686-3460); 
       or from Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Bur eau of Commissions, 
       Elections & Legislation, 305 North Office Building, Harrisburg, PA 
       17120; or in the Third Circuit Clerk's Office, U.S. Courthouse, 601 
       Market Street, Room 21400, Philadelphia, P A 19106. This 
       information will be updated at the Clerk's Office every 60 days, 
and 
       the names of parties and counsel will be checked against 
       contributions of record only at the issuance of the briefing order 
in 
       the case. 
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       E. THOMAS HENEFER, ESQUIRE 
        (ARGUED) 
       Stevens & Lee 
       111 North Sixth Street 
       P.O. Box 679 
       Reading, PA 19603 
 
       CHARLES J. BLOOM, ESQUIRE 
       Stevens & Lee 
       1275 Drummers Lane 
       P.O. Box 236, Suite 202 
       Wayne, PA 19087 
 
       Counsel for Appellee/Third-Party 
       Plaintiff Mutual Life Insurance Co. of 
       New York 
 
       DANIEL MORGAN, ESQUIRE 
       O'Malley & Harris 
       345 Wyoming Avenue 
       Scranton, PA 18503 
 
       Counsel for Appellee/Third Party 
       Plaintiff Richard A. Bulger 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Since July 2000, the Court has utilized the Rendell`95 contributor 
data base (as updated), comparing the entries ther eon with the counsel 
and parties in cases in this Court. In this instance, the case was 
assigned to the panel prior to the time when the automated check of 
campaign contributions of Rendell `95 had been fully integrated into the 
Court's recusal system. Judge Rendell ther efore had no constructive 
knowledge of a contribution to her husband's campaign by counsel for 
one of the parties to this appeal. In fact, she also had no actual 
knowledge of any such contribution or of any gr ound upon which her 
impartiality could reasonably be questioned. 
 
However, once the recusal problem appeared, earlier this month upon 
circulation of the opinion to the full Court, she determined to recuse, in 
the absence of agreement of all parties that she continue, which was not 
forthcoming. 
 
Chief Judge Becker and Judge Magill have conferr ed in the wake of 
this development and reaffirm their commitment to the opinion as 
written. Accordingly, the opinion is filed notwithstanding the recusal of 
Judge Rendell. See 28 U.S.C. S 46(d). 
 
                                4 
  
       DANIEL T. BRIER, ESQUIRE 
       Myers, Brier & Kelly 
       425 Spruce Street, Suite 200 
       Scranton, PA 18503 
 
       Counsel for Appellees/Third Party 
       Defendants Eudora Bennett; 
       Montrose Medical Arts Pharmacy, 
       Inc.; Medical Arts Nursing Center, 
       Inc.; and Medical Arts Clinic 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This appeal, set in the context of an ERISA br each of 
fiduciary duty action, largely concer ns the doctrine of 
judicial estoppel. The District Court applied the doctrine to 
bar Plaintiffs Montrose General Hospital, Inc. (Hospital) and 
Montrose Medical Group Participating Savings Plan (Plan) 
from asserting that the Plan is covered by ERISA on 
account of representations they had made in a related prior 
litigation. Because this suit is based on the pr emise that 
ERISA governs the Plan, the District Court's ruling 
rendered the Hospital and the Plan unable to state a prima 
facie case. The court therefore enter ed summary judgment 
in favor of Defendants Mutual Life Insurance Company of 
New York (MONY), whose insurance policies funded the 
Plan, and Richard Bulger, an outside consultant affiliated 
with MONY who had brought the parties together . 
 
Judicial estoppel may be imposed only if: (1) the party to 
be estopped is asserting a position that is irr econcilably 
inconsistent with one he or she asserted in a prior 
proceeding; (2) the party changed his or her position in bad 
faith, i.e., in a culpable manner threatening to the court's 
authority or integrity; and (3) the use of judicial estoppel is 
tailored to address the affr ont to the court's authority or 
integrity. Though we agree that the inconsistency prong is 
satisfied in this case, the other two are not. Guided by 
Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., 526 U.S. 
795 (1999), we hold that a party has not displayed bad 
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faith for judicial estoppel purposes if the initial claim was 
never accepted or adopted by a court or agency. Because 
the earlier statements in this case were never accepted or 
adopted, judicial estoppel was inappropriate. 
 
We hold in the alternative that application of judicial 
estoppel was not tailored to address any harm occasioned 
by the change of positions. First, the only "har m" identified 
by the District Court was inflicted upon thir d parties-- 
fourteen plan participants who had sued the Hospital, the 
Plan, MONY, and Bulger in the prior litigation. Judicial 
estoppel's sole valid use, however, is to r emedy an affront 
to the court's integrity. Second, judicial estoppel is an 
inappropriate sanction here because its ef fects would be 
borne not by any wrongdoers, but by innocent third 
parties. 
 
Having determined that the District Court was wrong to 
invoke judicial estoppel, we turn to MONY's and Bulger's 
alternate grounds for affirmance. We ultimately decline to 
rule on most of them, concluding instead that it would be 
better to let the District Court pass on them in thefirst 
instance. We do, however, reach and reject MONY's and 
Bulger's assertion that they are entitled to summary 
judgment on statute of limitations grounds. 
 
I. 
 
In the late 1970s, the Hospital decided to cr eate a 
retirement plan. It informed its accountant, Defendant 
Walter Garvey, of its intentions.1  Garvey, in turn, contacted 
Bulger, an outside consultant who was affiliated with 
MONY. Bulger proposed a plan, which the Hospital 
ultimately adopted. The Plan was plagued by financial 
troubles from the beginning, and, acting on advice from 
Bulger, the Hospital altered its funding mechanism on 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Garvey never moved for summary judgment. Concluding that there 
was no just reason to delay this appeal and acting pursuant to the 
powers conferred upon it by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), the 
District Court directed the clerk to enter afinal judgment in favor of 
MONY and Bulger. The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1331. Ours is conferred by 28 U.S.C.S 1291. 
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several occasions. These efforts were ultimately 
unsuccessful, and the Hospital ceased paying pr emiums in 
connection with the Plan in either late 1991 or early 1992. 
 
Soon thereafter, fourteen of the sixty-seven plan 
participants sued the Hospital, the Plan, MONY , Bulger, 
and Garvey. We will refer to this suit as either the "Hickok 
action" or the "Hickok litigation," after its first named 
plaintiff, June Hickok. The Hickok plaintiffs alleged that the 
Plan was governed by ERISA, and charged the defendants 
with numerous violations of their purportedfiduciary duties 
under that statute. In their Answer, the Hospital and the 
Plan raised eight defenses, two of which are pertinent here. 
Paragraph 7 "specifically denied that the plan[was] an 
employee pension benefit plan within the meaning of 
section 3 of ERISA," and Paragraph 11 averr ed that "[t]he 
claims of the Plaintiffs [were] barred by the statute of 
limitations." The Hospital and the Plan r epeated these 
claims in their Amended Answer and Pre-T rial 
Memorandum. 
 
The Hickok action settled for $600,000 in May 1994. 
MONY and Bulger assumed responsibility for $500,000, 
and the Hospital and the Plan were requir ed to pay the 
remaining $100,000. The settlement was distributed among 
the fourteen plan participants who were plaintiffs in 
Hickok; nothing was paid to the fifty-thr ee who were not. 
 
Following closely on the heels of the Hickok settlement, 
the Hospital and the Plan brought this action against 
MONY, Bulger, and Garvey, seeking to press claims on 
behalf of the remaining fifty-three plan participants. The 
claims in this case are essentially the same as those 
against which the Hospital and the Plan were co-defendants 
in Hickok.2 The Complaint avers that "[t]he plaintiff Plan is 
an employee benefit plan within the meaning ofS 3(2)(A) of 
ERISA," and that the Hospital is bringing this suit in its 
capacity as fiduciary of the Plan. The Hospital and the Plan 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The parties disagree as to whether the Settlement Agreement and 
Release that ended the Hickok action specifically preserved or precluded 
the Hospital and the Plan from later suing MONY , Bulger, and Garvey. 
The District Court has never definitively ruled on the question. 
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have not countered the charge that if the claims in Hickok 
were time-barred, then those in this case are as well. 
 
Discovery ensued and both MONY and Bulger eventually 
moved for summary judgment. In support of their motions, 
MONY and Bulger averred that: (1) judicial estoppel should 
bar the claims against them; (2) the claims wer e untimely; 
(3) they were not ERISA fiduciaries; (4) the Hospital and the 
Plan were not entitled to equitable relief; and (5) the 
Hospital's and the Plan's "prohibited transaction" claims 
were without merit. Ruling on the motions, the District 
Court invoked judicial estoppel to bar the Hospital and the 
Plan from repudiating their previously expressed position 
that ERISA did not apply to the Plan. Because the claims 
pressed in this suit rest on an assertion that ERISA governs 
the Plan, the District Court's holding render ed the Hospital 
and the Plan unable to state a prima facie case, and the 
court entered summary judgment on behalf of MONY and 
Bulger. With regard to the other proffered bases for 
summary judgment, the court remarked that "[a]n 
examination of the record reveals . .. material issues of fact 
that would militate against granting summary judgment. In 
light of the application of judicial estoppel . . ., these other 
issues, however, need not be addressed." This appeal 
followed. 
 
II. 
 
Federal courts possess inherent equitable authority to 
sanction malfeasance. One such sanction is judicial 
estoppel. See Klein v. Stahl GMBH & Co. Maschinefabrik, 
185 F.3d 98, 109 (3d Cir. 1999). For r easons explained in 
the margin, judicial estoppel is distinct fr om both equitable 
and collateral estoppel.3 When pr operly invoked, judicial 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. "Judicial estoppel looks to the connection between the litigant and the 
judicial system while equitable estoppel focuses on the relationship 
between the parties to the prior litigation." Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. 
v. 
United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 419 (3d Cir. 1988). Privity and 
detrimental reliance--prerequisites for the application of equitable 
estoppel--are not required for invocation of judicial estoppel. See Ryan 
Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 360 (3d 
Cir. 1996). Collateral estoppel is used to pr otect the finality of 
judgments 
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estoppel bars a litigant from asserting a position that is 
inconsistent with one he or she previously took before a 
court or agency. Summary judgment is appropriate when 
operation of judicial estoppel renders a litigant unable to 
state a prima facie case. 
 
Three requirements must be met befor e a district court 
may properly apply judicial estoppel. First, the party to be 
estopped must have taken two positions that ar e 
irreconcilably inconsistent. See Ryan Operations G.P. v. 
Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 361 (3d Cir. 
1996). Second, judicial estoppel is unwarranted unless the 
party changed his or her position "in bad faith--i.e., with 
intent to play fast and loose with the court." Id. Finally, a 
district court may not employ judicial estoppel unless it is 
"tailored to address the harm identified" and no lesser 
sanction would adequately remedy the damage done by the 
litigant's misconduct. Klein, 185 F.3d at 108 (quotation 
marks and citation omitted).4 
 
Though a district court's ultimate decision to invoke the 
doctrine is reviewed only for abuse of discr etion, see 
Anjelino v. New York Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 100 (3d Cir. 
2000), a court "abuses its discretion when its ruling is 
founded on an error of law or a misapplication of law to the 
facts," In re O'Brien, 186 F .3d 116, 125 (3d Cir. 1999). In 
this case, we agree with the District Court that the Hospital 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
and to conserve judicial resources, see Dici v. Pennsylvania, 91 F.3d 542, 
547 (3d Cir. 1996), whereas judicial estoppel is concerned solely with 
protecting the integrity of the courts, see Klein, 185 F.3d at 109. And 
though collateral estoppel may not be employed unless the underlying 
issue was actually litigated, see Witkowski v. Welch, 173 F.3d 192, 198- 
99 (3d Cir. 1999), there is no such r equirement for the use of judicial 
estoppel, see Anjelino v. New York Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 100 (3d Cir. 
2000). 
 
4. We acknowledge that our cases have sometimes omitted this final 
inquiry and referred to Ryan Operations's "two threshold questions." 
Motley v. New Jersey, 196 F.3d 160, 163 (3d Cir. 1999); see also 
McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F .3d 610, 618 (3d Cir. 1996). But 
because Klein squarely held that a district court may not invoke judicial 
estoppel without also conducting this inquiry, see 185 F.3d at 108-11, 
we conclude that it is a necessary part of the analysis. 
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and the Plan have taken inconsistent positions. W e hold, 
however, that the District Court's finding of bad faith was 
built upon an error of law, and was ther efore unsound. We 
hold also that the District Court abused its discr etion in 
concluding that judicial estoppel was an appr opriate 
sanction in this case because it was not tailor ed to address 
an affront to the court's integrity and because its use would 
create rather than defeat a miscarriage of justice.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Although both parties briefed it, the possibility of judicial estoppel 
was 
never addressed during the lengthy oral ar gument before the District 
Court. It surfaced in the court's opinion. W e have held that a district 
court need not always conduct an evidentiary hearing before finding the 
existence of bad faith for judicial estoppel purposes, see Klein, 185 F.3d 
at 111 n.13; Ryan Operations, 81 F.3d at 364-65, but two precepts are 
nevertheless clear. First, a court considering the use of judicial 
estoppel 
should ensure that the party to be estopped has been given a meaningful 
opportunity to provide "an explanation" for its changed position. 
Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 807 (1999). 
Second, though a court may sometimes "discer n" bad faith without 
holding an evidentiary hearing, it may not do so if the ultimate finding 
of bad faith cannot be reached without first resolving genuine disputes 
as to the underlying facts. The facts of this case provide an apt 
illustration. The parties agree that the Hospital and the Plan changed 
their position regarding ERISA's applicability to the Plan following the 
settlement of the Hickok action, but vehemently disagree why they did 
so. According to MONY and Bulger, the change represented a cynical 
attempt to forestall future suits and to secure a hefty recovery for the 
Hospital's owners and other highly-paid employees. Not surprisingly, the 
Hospital and the Plan offer a differ ent account, claiming that years of 
deception by MONY and Bulger falsely led them to believe that the Plan 
was not covered by ERISA until efforts by their current counsel revealed 
the truth. If the account offered by the Hospital and the Plan is 
accurate, 
then they may have been negligent for not realizing that MONY and 
Bulger were dissembling sooner, but they almost certainly did not act in 
bad faith vis-a-vis the court. In such a situation, it would generally be 
inappropriate to make a finding of bad faith without first determining 
which of these conflicting accounts is true--something that could not be 
done without an evidentiary hearing. Fortunately, as will become clear, 
the neglect of the judicial estoppel issue earlier in this case has not 
impeded our resolution of this appeal. 
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A. 
 
The Hospital and the Plan have taken inconsistent 
positions. Three times during the Hickok  action they 
specifically denied that the Plan was cover ed by ERISA, but 
this suit is based on the premise that it is. Furthermore, 
the Hospital and the Plan do not deny that the claims they 
press in this suit are materially identical to the ones 
brought in Hickok. The Hospital and the Plan argued that 
the Hickok claims were time-barr ed, and the claims in this 
case were brought after those in Hickok. If the Hickok 
action was time-barred, then this one is as well. We 
therefore agree with the District Court that the 
inconsistency element is satisfied. 
 
B. 
 
Inconsistencies are not sanctionable unless a litigant has 
taken one or both positions "in bad faith--i.e., with intent 
to play fast and loose with the court." Ryan Operations G.P. 
v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 361 (3d Cir. 
1996). A finding of bad faith "must be based on more than" 
the existence of an inconsistency, Klein v. Stahl GMBH & 
Co. Maschinefabrik, 185 F.3d 98, 111 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(emphasis added); indeed, a litigant has not acted in "bad 
faith" for judicial estoppel purposes unless two 
requirements are met. First, he or she must have behaved 
in a manner that is somehow culpable. See Ryan 
Operations, 81 F.3d at 362 (stating that judicial estoppel 
may not be employed unless " `intentional self contradiction 
is . . . used as a means of obtaining unfair advantage' " 
(quoting Scarano v. Central R. Co. of N.J., 203 F.2d 510, 
513 (3d Cir. 1953) (emphasis added))); id. ("An inconsistent 
argument sufficient to invoke judicial estoppel must be 
attributable to intentional wrongdoing ." (emphasis added)); 
see also In re Chambers Dev. Co. Inc., 148 F.3d 214, 229 
(3d Cir. 1998) (quoting this language fr om Ryan 
Operations). 
 
Second, a litigant may not be estopped unless he or she 
has engaged in culpable behavior vis-a-vis the court. As we 
have stressed time and time again, judicial estoppel is 
concerned with the relationship between litigants and the 
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legal system, and not with the way that adversaries treat 
each other. See, e.g., Ryan Operations , 81 F.3d at 360 
("Judicial estoppel `is intended to pr otect the courts rather 
than the litigants.' " (quoting Fleck v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 
981 F.2d 107, 121-22 (3d Cir. 1992))); Delgrosso v. Spang 
& Co., 903 F.2d 234, 241 (3d Cir. 1990) (same). 
Accordingly, judicial estoppel may not be employed unless 
a litigant's culpable conduct has assaulted the dignity or 
authority of the court. 
 
To assess whether the Hospital and the Plan have 
engaged in wrongful conduct that may fairly be described 
as a threat to the integrity of the courts, we must review 
what they did. In the Hickok action, fourteen plan 
participants charged the Hospital and the Plan with 
violating ERISA-imposed fiduciary duties. In their Answer, 
Amended Answer, and Pre-Trial Memorandum, the Hospital 
and the Plan averred, among other defenses, that the Plan 
was not subject to ERISA and that the plaintif fs' claims 
were time-barred. Before the district court ruled on any 
dispositive motions and before the case went to trial, the 
parties settled, and the case was dismissed. Shortly 
thereafter, the Hospital and the Plan br ought the present 
suit on behalf of the fifty-three plan participants who had 
not been plaintiffs in Hickok. In this litigation, the Hospital 
and the Plan assert--in direct contravention of their 
positions in Hickok--that the Plan is  covered by ERISA and 
that the specific claims (which are, in all r elevant respects, 
identical to those they argued were untimely while 
defending Hickok) are timely. 
 
The important threshold question--the answer to which 
we find dispositive in this case--is whether a district court 
may properly find the existence of bad faith if the initial 
inconsistent statement was never accepted or adopted by a 
court or agency. MONY and Bulger apparently assume that 
it may. Guided by the Supreme Court's r ecent decision in 
Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., 526 U.S. 
795 (1999), we disagree. 
 
The issue in Cleveland was whether a person who sought 
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits could 
later be judicially estopped from claiming pr otected status 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). In seeking 
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SSDI benefits, the claimant certified that she was "disabled" 
and "unable to work," but in a later ADA suit she 
submitted that she could "perform the essential functions" 
of a job "with . . . a reasonable accommodation." See id. at 
798-99. Observing "that, in context, these two seeming 
divergent statutory contentions are often consistent with 
each other," the Court held that "pursuit, and receipt, of 
SSDI benefits does not automatically estop the r ecipient 
from pursuing an ADA claim." Id. at 797. 
 
Though Cleveland's earlier claim had been accepted by 
the administrative agency, see id. at 802 (stating that she 
had "both applied for, and received, SSDI benefits"), the 
Court laid down guidance highly pertinent to this case. 
Quoting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(e)(2), it noted that 
"[o]ur ordinary Rules recognize that a person may not be 
sure in advance upon which legal theory she will succeed, 
and so permit parties to `set forth two or more statements 
of a claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically' and to 
`state as many separate claims and defenses as the party 
has regardless of consistency.' " Id. at 805. Stressing that "if 
an individual has merely applied for, but had not been 
awarded, SSDI benefits, any inconsistency in the theory of 
the claims is of the sort normally tolerated by our legal 
system," the Court opined that it did "not see why the law 
in respect to the assertion of SSDI and ADA claims should 
differ." Id. 
 
Guided by Cleveland, we hold that it does not constitute 
bad faith to assert contrary positions in dif ferent 
proceedings when the initial claim was never accepted or 
adopted by a court or agency. Because the practice is 
specifically sanctioned by the Federal Rules, asserting 
inconsistent claims within a single action obviously does 
not constitute misconduct that threatens the court's 
integrity. In Cleveland, the Supreme Court drew a direct 
parallel between pleading inconsistently in a single case 
and doing so in subsequent ones, so long as the initial 
claim was never sustained. Moreover, the Court described 
the latter type of inconsistencies as "the sort normally 
tolerated by our legal system." Though the Court did not 
use the magic words--"it is not bad faith to assert 
inconsistent claims in separate actions so long as the initial 
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position was never accepted by a court or agency"-- 
Cleveland's import is clear. 
 
The rule we adopt is consistent with judicial estoppel's 
purpose of protecting the integrity of the courts. "Judicial 
estoppel addresses the incongruity of allowing a party to 
assert a position in one tribunal and the opposite in 
another tribunal. If the second tribunal adopted the party's 
inconsistent position, then at least one court has probably 
been misled." Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 
599 (6th Cir. 1982). But if a party's initial position was 
never accepted by a court or agency, then it is difficult to 
see how a later change manifests an "intent to play fast and 
loose with the court[s]," Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam- 
Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 361 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(emphasis added), any more than pleading inconsistently in 
a single action does. We think this insight explains why the 
consensus view among our sister circuits is that judicial 
estoppel is inappropriate unless the earlier position was 
accepted by a court or agency.6 This rule also has support 
in our cases. See Fleck v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 981 F.2d 
107, 121 (3d Cir. 1992) ("[W]her e a party assumes a certain 
position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining 
that position, he may not thereafter , simply because his 
interests have changed, assume a contrary position . . . ." 
(quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added)). 
 
We are unpersuaded by MONY's and Bulger's contentions 
that Cleveland is inapplicable here, or that stare decisis 
precludes adoption of the rule we announce today. Citing 
Gruber v. Hubbard Bert Karle Weber , Inc., 159 F.3d 780, 
789 (3d Cir. 1998), and Deibler v. United Food & 
Commercial Workers' Local Union 23, 973 F.2d 206, 209 (3d 
Cir. 1992), they submit that the question whether a plan is 
covered by ERISA is one of fact rather than law. And 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. See Faigin v. Kelly, 184 F.3d 67, 82 (1st Cir. 1999); Wight v. 
Bankamerica Corp., 219 F.3d 79, 90-91 (2d Cir. 2000); United 
Mineworkers of Am. v. Marrowbone Dev. Co., 232 F.3d 283, 290 (4th Cir. 
2000); Lara v. Trominski, 216 F .3d 487, 495 n.9 (5th Cir. 2000); 
McMeans v. Brigano, 228 F.3d 674, 686 (6th Cir. 2000); Feldman v. 
American Mem'l Life Ins. Co., 196 F.3d 783, 790 (7th Cir. 1999); Tuveson 
v. Florida Governor's Counsel on Indian Af fairs, Inc., 734 F.2d 730, 735 
(11th Cir. 1984) (same rule characterized as equitable estoppel). 
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because in Cleveland the Supreme Court expressly declined 
to disturb the law of judicial estoppel relating to "purely 
factual matters, such as `The light was r ed/green,' or `I 
can/cannot raise my arm above my head,' " 526 U.S. at 
802, they suggest that Cleveland has no applicability to the 
issue now before us. We reject this contention for two 
reasons. First, it is waived because it was raised for the 
first time at oral argument. See W arren G. v. Cumberland 
County Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 80, 84 (3d Cir. 1999). Second, 
we conclude that it is simply wrong on the merits. Though 
the question whether a particular plan is cover ed by ERISA 
may not be one of pure law, it is also not a"purely factual 
matter" in the sense the phrase was used in Cleveland.7 
 
MONY and Bulger also submit that our pre-Cleveland 
case law precludes us from holding that there can be no 
bad faith for judicial estoppel purposes if the earlier 
statement was never accepted by a court or agency. First, 
to the extent this claim is true, we note simply that we owe 
greater fidelity to the decisions of the Supr eme Court than 
to our own. Second, we disagree that any of our cases have 
actually held that judicial estoppel may be imposed in a 
situation such as this one. 
 
The only case that MONY and Bulger cite in support of 
their claim that judicial estoppel may lie in situations 
where the initial claim was never accepted or adopted by a 
court or agency is Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest 
Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 1996). Their reliance is 
misplaced. Ryan Operations held that a party seeking 
estoppel need not have been a party to the earlier 
proceedings, see id. at 359-60, and that the party facing 
estoppel need not have necessarily "benefitted" from its 
switch in position, see id. at 361. But Ryan Operations 
never stated that judicial estoppel could validly be applied 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Because Cleveland specifically declined to speak to the issue, and 
because there may be good reasons to apply a different rule in such 
cases, we intimate no view as to whether the rule we announce today 
should apply when the inconsistent statements involve purely factual 
matters. 
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in a case where the initial position was never accepted by 
a court or agency.8 
 
Though our holding today may appear to be in some 
tension with our statement in Ryan Operations that there is 
no "independent requirement" that a party have "benefitted 
from its earlier position" to be estopped fr om changing it 
later, id. at 361, this tension is more apparent than real. 
First, the Ryan Operations principle r emains true today: so 
long as the initial claim was in some way accepted or 
adopted, no further showing is necessary that the party 
"benefitted" in any particular way. See, e.g., Anjelino v. New 
York Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 100 (3d Cir. 2000) (upholding 
a district court's use of judicial estoppel wher e a litigant 
sought to withdraw its previous repr esentation to the court 
that no further discovery was needed). Second, our rule is 
consistent with Ryan Operations's admonition that "benefit 
may be relevant insofar as it evidences an intent to play 
fast and loose with the courts." 81 F.3d at 361. We do not 
hold that judicial or administrative acceptance is a 
prerequisite for its own sake, but rather conclude that a 
change of position simply cannot evidence bad faith vis-a- 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Indeed, the inconsistent "statement" in Ryan Operations had been 
accepted by a court. That case involved a construction company's suit 
against the manufacturer and suppliers of wood trim that it had used in 
constructing houses. Prior to filing suit, the construction company had 
filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 
which required it to disclose all assets and liabilities, including 
potential 
claims and causes of action. In violation of these r equirements, the 
construction company's disclosure statement did not mention its claims 
against the manufacturer and suppliers. The r eoganization plan was 
confirmed seven months after the construction company brought suit, 
and the defendants then moved for summary judgment on judicial 
estoppel grounds. In rejecting the district court's grant of judicial 
estoppel, we assumed without deciding that failur e to comply with the 
Bankruptcy Code's disclosure obligations "can support a finding that a 
plaintiff has asserted inconsistent positions within the meaning of the 
judicial estoppel doctrine." Id. at 362. But in that case, the parties' 
initial 
inconsistent "statement"--i.e., its failur e to list its claims against 
the 
manufacturer and the suppliers in its originalfiling --had been implicitly 
accepted by the bankruptcy court when it appr oved the plan of 
reorganization. 
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vis a court unless the initial statement was accepted or 
adopted.9 
 
C. 
 
During the course of the Hickok action, the Hospital and 
the Plan averred that ERISA did not apply to the Plan and 
that the plaintiffs' claims were barr ed by the statute of 
limitations. These claims, however, wer e never accepted or 
adopted by the district court. Accordingly, their later 
change in position cannot, as a matter of law, constitute 
bad faith. We therefore hold that the District Court abused 
its discretion by invoking judicial estoppel. 
 
III. 
 
We also hold in the alternative that the District Court 
abused its discretion by concluding that judicial estoppel 
was tailored to address any harm caused by the 
inconsistent statements in this case. Judicial estoppel "is 
an `extraordinary remedy' " that should be employed only 
" `when a party's inconsistent behavior would otherwise 
result in a miscarriage of justice.' " Ryan Operations G.P. v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. We acknowledge that McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610 (3d 
Cir. 1996) and Lewandowski v. Amtrak, 882 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1989) 
contain language that could be read as saying that acceptance or 
adoption is not a prerequisite for the invocation of judicial estoppel, 
but 
we decline to so conclude. First, as noted pr eviously, our duty to follow 
Cleveland supersedes the requirement that we adhere to prior Third 
Circuit law. Second, in both McNemar and Lewandowski, the party 
making the inconsistent statements had succeeded in persuading the 
original tribunal to adopt his position. See McNemar, 91 F.3d at 615; 
Lewandowski, 88 F.2d at 817. We also note that McNemar's actual 
holding is no longer good law after Cleveland  because the two cases 
involved the same issue. See Klein, 185 F .3d at 108 n.6. Moreover, 
Lewandowski involved an appeal from a decision of a public law board 
rather than a district court. We could not have set aside the board's 
decision unless it had "failed to comply with the provisions of the RLA[,] 
failed to confine itself to matters within its jurisdiction, or if there 
was 
fraud or corruption." Lewandowski, 882 F .2d at 819. Under such a high 
standard, we could not have granted the petition even had the board's 
decision failed to comport with our standards for invoking judicial 
estoppel. 
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Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 365 (3d Cir. 
1996) (quoting Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey 
Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 419 (3d Cir. 1988) (Stapleton, J., 
dissenting)). Observing that judicial estoppel "is often the 
harshest remedy" that a court can impose for inequitable 
conduct, we have held that a district court may not invoke 
the doctrine unless: (1) "no sanction established by the 
Federal Rules or a pertinent statute is up to the task of 
remedying the damage done by a litigant's malfeasance;" 
and (2) "the sanction [of judicial estoppel] is tailored to 
address the harm identified." Klein v. Stahl GMBH & Co. 
Maschinefabrik, 185 F.3d 98, 108, 110 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In this 
case, the District Court failed to conduct the for mer 
inquiry, and we hold that its conclusion that judicial 
estoppel was tailored to address any har m caused by the 
inconsistent representations was not an exercise of sound 
discretion. 
 
The application of judicial estoppel constitutes an 
exercise of a court's inherent power to sanction 
misconduct. See id. at 109. "Because of their very potency, 
inherent powers must be exercised with r estraint and 
discretion." Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 
(1991). In Chambers, the Supreme Court held that where 
"bad-faith conduct in the course of litigation[can] be 
adequately sanctioned under" either the Federal Rules or a 
particular statute, then a "court ordinarily should rely on" 
the Rules or the statute "rather than the inher ent power." 
Id. But, said the Court, "if in the infor med discretion of the 
court" these other sources of authority ar e not "up to the 
task, the court may safely rely on its inher ent power." Id. In 
Klein, we interpreted Chambers to mean "that the Rules are 
not `up to the task' when they would not pr ovide a district 
court with the authority to sanction all of the conduct 
deserving of sanction." 185 F.3d at 109. But we squarely 
held that before utilizing its inherent powers, a district 
court should consider whether any Rule- or statute-based 
sanctions are up to the task. See id. at 110. In this case, 
the District Court did not consider whether any such 
sanctions (some of which are set forth in the margin) would 
 
                                18 
  
have sufficed to deal with any misconduct that occurred in 
this case.10 That was err or. 
 
Moreover, even had the District Court concluded that use 
of its inherent sanctioning power was necessary, we would 
still hold that judicial estoppel was inappr opriate here. In 
Klein we held that judicial estoppel, like all exercises of a 
court's inherent sanctioning power, may not be used unless 
it is "tailored to address the har m." Id. at 111. And we 
stated that judicial estoppel is not so tailor ed unless, "at a 
minimum," the party to be estopped took inconsistent 
positions in bad faith--implicitly recognizing that more 
would sometimes be required. Id. (emphasis added). We 
noted the same possibility in Ryan Operations . See 81 F.3d 
at 365 ("As we have already concluded that the district 
court erred [in employing judicial estoppel], we need not 
reach Ryan's argument that [its use] under the 
circumstances of this case would violate principles of equity 
and justice. . . . [However, i]n this case, application of 
judicial estoppel would be unduly harsh and inequitable. 
While we need not and do not decide whether we would 
reverse the district court's order on this ground alone, our 
equitable concerns lend support to our overall 
conclusion."). 
 
The District Court erred in determining that judicial 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 authorizes a court to sanction a 
party that files "a pleading, written motion, or other paper," if: (1) the 
document was "presented for an[ ] improper purpose;" (2) the "legal 
contentions" contained in it were not "warranted by existing law or by a 
nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law or the establishment of new law;" (3) the document 
contained "allegations or [other] factual contentions" that did not have 
evidentiary support or denials of an opponent's"factual contention" 
without evidentiary support." Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 permits 
a court to sanction certain discovery-related misconduct. And 28 U.S.C. 
S 1927 provides that "[a]ny attor ney . . . who so multiplies the 
proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required 
. . . to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses and attorneys' fees 
reasonably incurred because of such conduct." We do not intimate that 
these or any other particular Rule- or statute-based sanctions would 
have been available or "up to the task" in this case. We hold only that 
the District Court erred by not considering the issue. 
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estoppel would be tailored to address any harm in this case 
for two reasons. First, judicial estoppel is not an 
appropriate response to the only type of harm identified by 
the court. In its explanation of why judicial estoppel was 
"appropriate relief in this case," the court faulted the 
Hospital and the Plan for "abandon[ing]" the fourteen plan 
participants who were plaintiffs in Hickok, but now seeking 
to assert precisely the same claims on behalf of fifty-three 
other participants who were not involved in Hickok. The 
difficultly with the District Court's reasoning is that judicial 
estoppel may not be used to punish litigants for how they 
treat other litigants or third parties;11 its only legitimate 
purpose is to remedy an affront to the court's integrity. See, 
e.g., Ryan Operations, 81 F.3d at 360 ("Judicial estoppel `is 
intended to protect the courts rather than the litigants.' " 
(quoting Fleck v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 981 F.2d 107, 121- 
22 (3d Cir. 1992))). Because the court's opinion contains no 
hint that it invoked judicial estoppel to respond to a threat 
to its own authority, the sanction was not tailor ed to 
address the harm in this case. 
 
Perhaps more fundamentally, judicial estoppel was 
simply not tailored to address any malfeasance that may 
have occurred here. The only potential wr ongdoers are the 
Hospital and the Plan, and the District Court's application 
of judicial estoppel did result in the dismissal of their 
claims against MONY and Bulger. The pr oblem arises 
because the Hospital and the Plan do not seek personal 
gain in this case, but rather bring this action solely in their 
fiduciary capacities on behalf of fifty-thr ee plan 
participants. It is those participants, not the Hospital and 
the Plan, that will be harmed by the District Court's 
dismissal. Even assuming that the Hospital and the Plan 
acted wrongly in "abandon[ing]" the Hickok plaintiffs, it is 
difficult to see how equity would be served by punishing 
fifty-three other plan participants in r eturn. 
 
In sum, the District Court erred in not considering 
whether any Rule or statute was "up to the task" before 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The fourteen Plan participants whom the District Court faulted the 
Hospital and the Plan for abandoning were other litigants in the Hickok 
litigation and are third parties in this case. 
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deciding to utilize its inherent sanctioning power, and 
abused its discretion in concluding that judicial estoppel 
was tailored to address any harm in this case. 
 
IV. 
 
MONY and Bulger advance several alternate gr ounds for 
affirming the District Court's judgment. They aver that, as 
a matter of law: (1) the claims against them ar e time- 
barred; (2) they cannot be held liable under ERISA because 
they were not fiduciaries of the Plan; (3) the Hospital and 
the Plan are not entitled to "equitable r elief "; and (4) the 
Hospital and the Plan cannot prevail on their"prohibited 
transactions" claim. MONY and Bulger raised these 
arguments before the District Court, which declined to 
reach them in light of its judicial estoppel holding. The 
court did comment, however, that: "An examination of the 
record in relation to these other gr ounds asserted as bases 
for summary judgment reveals material issues of fact that 
would militate against granting summary judgment." 
 
Though we certainly could reach and rule on each of the 
alternate grounds, we conclude--subject to one exception-- 
that interests of sound judicial administration compel that 
we remand the case without considering them. 12 This is a 
complicated case with a voluminous recor d. The able 
district judge plainly pondered these issues, and at one 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. "When a district court has failed to r each a question below that 
becomes critical when reviewed on appeal, an appellate court may 
sometimes resolve the issue on appeal rather than remand to the district 
court." Hudson United Bank v. LiTenda Mortgage Corp., 142 F.2d 151, 
159 (3d Cir. 1998). This practice is appropriate if: (1) "the factual 
record 
is developed;" and (2) "the issues provide purely legal questions[ ] upon 
which an appellate court exercises plenary r eview." Id. On the other 
hand, appellate courts should not step in "[w]hen the resolution of an 
issue requires the exercise of discretion or fact finding." Id. Hudson's 
requirements are met in this case. Because each party has filed a 
supplemental appendix, the factual recor d is developed. Had the District 
Court granted summary judgment on other grounds, our review would 
have been plenary. And whether a genuine issue of material fact exists 
presents a purely legal question that does not require or allow a district 
court to exercise discretion. In light of these facts, we are entitled to 
consider MONY's alternate grounds. 
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point suggested that there were genuine issues of material 
fact as to at least some of them. We think it better under 
these circumstances to let the District Court r eview in the 
first instance the arguments that neither Bulger nor MONY 
were ERISA fiduciaries, that the request for equitable relief 
should be denied, and that the prohibited transactions 
claim fails as a matter of law. Because the issue is so 
straightforward, however, we reach and reject MONY's claim 
that it is entitled to summary judgment on statute of 
limitations grounds. 
 
ERISA's statute of limitations for fiduciary violations 
expires on "the earlier of ": (1)"six years after . . . the date 
of the last action which constituted a part of the breach or 
violation;" or (2) "three years after the earliest date on 
which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or 
violation." The statute also provides, however, that "in the 
case of fraud or concealment," the period is extended to "six 
years after the date of discovery of such br each or 
violation." 29 U.S.C. S 1113. We have described Section 
1113 as creating "a general six year statute of limitations, 
shortened to three years in cases where the plaintiff has 
actual knowledge, and potentially extended to six years 
from the date of discovery in cases involving fraud or 
concealment." Kurz v. Philadelphia Elec. Co. , 96 F.3d 1544, 
1551 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
A. 
 
MONY and Bulger first contend that this suit is barred by 
ERISA's three year limitations period, which does not begin 
to run until "the plaintiff ha[s] actual knowledge of the 
breach or violation," 29 U.S.C. S 1113. We have interpreted 
the actual knowledge requirement "stringent[ly]." Gluck v. 
Unisys Corp., 960 F.2d 1168, 1176 (3d Cir . 1992); see also 
id. ("Section 1113 sets a high standar d for barring claims 
against fiduciaries prior to the expiration of the section's 
six-year limitations period."). Because other sections of 
ERISA demonstrate that "Congress knew how to require 
constructive knowledge," we have opined that"[w]e do not 
think that Congress' failure to" pr ovide such a standard "in 
section 1113 was accidental." Id. Accor dingly, we have held 
that "actual knowledge . . . requires that a plaintiff have 
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actual knowledge of all material facts necessary to 
understand that some claim exists," but we have 
emphasized "that our holding does not mean that the 
statute of limitations can never begin to run until a plaintiff 
first consults with a lawyer." Id. at 1177. 
 
MONY and Bulger recite seven facts that they claim show 
that the Hospital and the Plan had "actual knowledge of the 
facts necessary to understand that some claim existed" 
more than three years prior to filing this suit in December 
1994. They stress that: 
 
       - Bulger warned [the Hospital] in writing in 1988 
       about not paying premiums"; 
 
       - The Hospital "knew of persistent funding problems 
       for a ten year period"; 
 
       - The Plan Administrator "knew of the financial 
       problems by, at the latest, the late 1980s "; 
 
       - The Plan Administrator "knew [the Hospital] could 
       not make the payments by 1987"; 
 
       - The Hospital "stopped paying benefits in the summer 
       of 1991 and disclosed the problems to the 
       participants"; 
 
       - The Hospital's Administrator "reported to the 
       [Hospital's] Board before 1991  his conclusion that 
       the Plan could not continue"; and 
 
       - The Hospital received a letter fr om Plaintiff 's 
       counsel in the Hickok action "in November 1991 
       outlining potential ERISA violations and claims." 
 
These facts, MONY and Bulger contend, demonstrate that 
"by November 1991 (at the latest) [the Hospital and the 
Plan] had actual knowledge sufficient to understand that 
(as they allege) a fiduciary duty had been br eached or 
ERISA provision violated." 
 
We are unpersuaded. "Gluck . . . requires a showing that 
plaintiffs actually knew not only of the events that occurred 
which constitute the breach or violation but also that those 
events supported a claim of breach of fiduciary duty or 
violation under ERISA." International Union of Elec., Elec., 
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Salaried, Mach. & Furniture Workers v. Murata Erie N. Am., 
980 F.2d 889, 900 (3d Cir. 1992) (emphasis added). Until 
the Hospital and the Plan had actual knowledge that the 
Plan might be covered by ERISA, they obviously had no 
reason to suspect that any actions by MONY or Bulger 
could support a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under 
that statute. 
 
The only piece of evidence to which MONY and Bulger 
point that could have put the Hospital and the Plan on 
notice that the Plan was covered by ERISA was the letter 
the Hospital received in 1991 from the lawyer for the 
Hickok plaintiffs. Though the letter suggested that the Plan 
was subject to ERISA, two reasons counsel against reading 
this letter as establishing--as a matter of law--that the 
Hospital and the Plan thereafter possessed actual 
knowledge that they had ERISA claims against MONY and 
Bulger. First, the letter came from an attorney who was 
threatening to sue the Hospital and the Plan for ERISA 
violations. Parties are not requir ed to believe every claim 
hurled by their adversaries, nor are they likely to do so. 
Second, the letter in no way suggested that the Hospital 
and the Plan might have an ERISA action against MONY 
and Bulger. Though MONY and Bulger ar gue that this 
information was supplied by the other pieces of evidence to 
which they point to establish actual knowledge, we do not 
believe that the evidence must, as a matter of law, be read 
that way. We therefore decline to affirm the District Court's 
judgment on this alternate ground. 
 
B. 
 
Nor is this suit barred as a matter of law under the six 
year statute of limitations. ERISA's default limitations 
period expires "six years after . . . the date of the last action 
which constituted a part of the breach or violation." 29 
U.S.C. S 1113. "[I]n the case of fraud or concealment," 
however, this period is extended to "six years after the date 
of discovery of such breach or violation." Id. Even assuming 
that this suit was not brought within the general six year 
limitations period, we conclude that there is at least a 
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the fraud or 
concealment exception is applicable. 
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We have interpreted S 1113 "as incorporating the federal 
doctrine of fraudulent concealment: The statute of 
limitations is tolled until the plaintiff in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence discovered or should have discovered 
the alleged fraud or concealment." Kurz v. Philadelphia Elec. 
Co., 96 F.3d 1544 (3d Cir. 1996). Section 1113 applies 
"when a lawsuit has been delayed because the defendant 
itself has taken steps to hide its breach offiduciary duty," 
and "[t]he relevant question is . . . not whether the 
complaint `sounds in concealment,' but rather whether 
there is evidence that the defendant took affirmative steps 
to hide its breach of fiduciary duty." Id. It is generally 
accepted that "there must be actual concealment,--i.e., 
some trick or contrivance intended to exclude suspicion 
and prevent injury." Larson v. Northr op Corp., 21 F.3d 
1164, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
 
In arguing against the applicability of this exception, 
MONY and Bulger assert that neither of them concealed 
anything. But the Hospital and the Plan assert, with 
support in the record, that "fr om the time of the Plan's 
creation and throughout its 14-year operation, Defendants 
consistently deceived the Hospital by misrepr esenting that 
the Plan was not even subject to ERISA." They also submit, 
with record support, that although they were "generally 
aware that MONY, Bulger, and other MONY representatives 
were replacing various life insurance policies with new 
policies of the same or different types[,] . . . Bulger falsely 
represented to Hospital representatives that they would 
reduce costs while substantially increasing benefits." 
Finally, Eudora Bennett, the Plan Administrator , claimed in 
an affidavit that Bulger and Garvey thwarted her efforts "to 
gain access to information about the operations of the 
Plan." 
 
Assuming that these allegations are true, which we must 
for summary judgment purposes, we cannot conclude as a 
matter of law that no fraud or concealment occurr ed in this 
case. MONY and Bulger's (alleged) repeated denials that 
ERISA applied to the Plan could reasonably have hindered 
the Hospital and the Plan's ability to realize that any 
breach of ERISA-imposed fiduciary duties had occurred. 
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Further, it is possible that Bulger's (alleged) 
misrepresentations as to the reasons for replacing the life 
insurance policies inhibited their capacity to discover that 
the Plan had been imprudently designed. Finally, the 
(alleged) conduct of Bulger and Garvey may have actively 
impeded Bennett's ability to discover facts that could have 
led her to conclude that fiduciary violations had taken 
place. 
 
MONY and Bulger offer two responses. They aver that 
because " `[t]he problems sur faced soon after the 
establishment of the Plan,' " "the alleged design defects 
constituted information readily available to" the Hospital 
and the Plan. But MONY and Bulger provide no citations to 
the record, and fail to explain why the mere existence of 
problems means that the Hospital and the Plan were on 
notice that ERISA applied to the Plan or that it was 
designed in violation of ERISA-imposed fiduciary duties. 
Because conclusory allegations unsupported by explanation 
or facts in the record do not suffice to meet a movant's 
burden of persuasion, see 11 James Wm. Moore et al., 
Moore's Federal Practice S 56.13[1] (3d ed. 2000), we 
conclude that MONY and Bulger cannot prevail on this 
point. 
 
Finally, MONY and Bulger submit that there was no 
"reasonable reliance as is requir ed to trigger the fraud or 
concealment exception." They contend that the Hospital 
and the Plan "did not delay this lawsuit because of 
misrepresentations; instead, they delayed as long as 
possible to avoid subjecting themselves to liability and filed 
suit only after Hickok was resolved and they could no 
longer hope to avoid similar claims." MONY and Bulger 
point to no undisputed facts that demonstrate why the 
Hospital and the Plan brought this case when they did, 
and, accordingly, MONY and Bulger are not entitled to 
summary judgment on this ground. We ther efore hold that 
MONY and Bulger are not entitled to summary judgment on 
statute of limitations grounds. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District 
Court will be reversed and this case remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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